The Many Problems of EAAN, Part I
In his evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN), Plantinga argues given naturalism and evolutionary theory, the probability that we (in fact any product of such evolutionary theory) posses reliable cognitive faculty is low. So low, in fact, there is no good reason to believe in naturalism nor evolutionary theory as they are also derived from our cognitive faculty. In this three part blog I've outlined a number of flaws with his arguments and argue that EAAN points to the increasing irrelevance of academic philosophy to mainstream belief (or lack thereof) in a God.
Methodological naturalism (naturalism hereafter) says only that all natural phenomena are best explained by natural causes. Naturalism is a means to an end (that of explaining natural phenomena) and in principle says nothing about the (continued) successfulness of those that practice it. What is often the case with anti-naturalists like Plantinga is that they point to the lack of naturalistic explanation to a natural phenomenon and conclude naturalism is inconsistent (and shouldn’t be taken seriously). Herein lays the first problem with EAAN. By pointing to a gap in a naturalist’s explanation as to how the truthfulness of a belief can be casually efficacious in such a way as to be evolutionarily beneficial, Plantinga then makes the leap to conclude there is no good reason to believe the truthfulness of our belief (all that is derived from it, including naturalism and evolutionary theory). By replacing the experimenter (her success in carrying out the experiment to be exact) with the experiment itself, Plantinga commits the straw man fallacy. Not only has Plantinga placed the burden-of-(naturalistic)-proof for any natural phenomenon on the naturalists, but he equated naturalists’ inability to produce a proof for any given phenomenon as evidence against naturalism all together.
If history is any lesson, it has been the case that gaps in the naturalist explanatory scheme have been ‘short’-lived (perhaps we are biased to explore certain class of phenomena by our nature such that this is the case, but that is another story). There is every reason to believe this gap too will close and the anti-naturalists will search for other gaps to pick on.
Needless to say, there is also good reason to believe the truthfulness of our beliefs given naturalism and the evolutionary theory (N&E). When a naturalist holds a belief to be true, which presupposes she is capable of true beliefs (regardless of N&E or supernaturalism—more on this in part II), her theories (the truthfulness of her theories to be exact) are casually linked to the natural world (and generally are not mere conjectures of an inaccessible reality). Furthermore, statistically speaking, it is probable, given the verifiably truthful beliefs naturalism has produced thus far, her beliefs are trustworthy, even if the exact naturalistic explanation of why her beliefs are trustworthy given evolutionary theory elude her (for the time being).
If history is any lesson, it has been the case that gaps in the naturalist explanatory scheme have been ‘short’-lived (perhaps we are biased to explore certain class of phenomena by our nature such that this is the case, but that is another story). There is every reason to believe this gap too will close and the anti-naturalists will search for other gaps to pick on.
Needless to say, there is also good reason to believe the truthfulness of our beliefs given naturalism and the evolutionary theory (N&E). When a naturalist holds a belief to be true, which presupposes she is capable of true beliefs (regardless of N&E or supernaturalism—more on this in part II), her theories (the truthfulness of her theories to be exact) are casually linked to the natural world (and generally are not mere conjectures of an inaccessible reality). Furthermore, statistically speaking, it is probable, given the verifiably truthful beliefs naturalism has produced thus far, her beliefs are trustworthy, even if the exact naturalistic explanation of why her beliefs are trustworthy given evolutionary theory elude her (for the time being).
Re: The Many Problems of EAAN, Part I
Hi Ephraim:
Thanks for your response to what I’ve tried to share with you on your blog. I’ll try to address your points in order:
1) I was warning you and hoping that you’d not commit some of the standard fallacious reasoning to defend some vague views by some of the notorious “science populaziers” that I’ve mentioned in my earlier posts. Alas, my friend that you seem to be giving in to such cheap ways “refuting” some subtle, philosophically nuanced, views that you do not seem to have even understood what they truly are. Perhaps I’m totally wrong about what I’ve just said but then the following points are intended to support the preceding points at any rate:
a. First, you’ve not shown any (serious) problem, let alone detecting a straw man fallacy, in Plantinga’s work, in his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN).
b. You say, “What is often the case with anti-naturalists like Plantinga is that they point to the lack of naturalistic explanation to a natural phenomenon and conclude naturalism is inconsistent (and shouldn’t be taken seriously). Herein lays the first problem with EAAN”. What you’ve shared here is false. You’re attributing to Plantinga what you think is his take on the naturalism vs. theism debate. One central point of Plantinga’s claims is that given naturalism and evolutionary theory (he states what such a theory amounts to any ways) it’s the CONJUNCTION of naturalism and evolutionary theory that creates problems for naturalism, mind you. How do you reconcile what I’ve quoted from you above with what I’ve just shared, if the latter is correct and we can double-check such views at any rate? You just missed a subtle point and wrongly attributed to Plantinga something that is foreign to his view. This, indeed, is called a straw man fallacy, since you’re arguing against a weak, easily assailable view which is not the view of the person to whom you attribute and claim the other person is wrong whereas the truth is otherwise.
c. As a matter of fact, Plantings thinks naturalism is false but he does not conclude that naturalism is inconsistent as it is. I quote Plantinga: “Naturalism alone may(or many not) be tenable, and the same goes to the view that we have evolved by way of the mechanisms to which contemporary evolutionary theory directs our attention; the conjunction of these two propositions, however, can’t rationally be accepted”. Link is provided below for the source of this quote.
d. If and when one is more careful about what one writes, one usually faces the inevitable: with the other daunting option of dealing with the serious argument one’s opponent holds and I want to see your argument exactly against what Plantinga’s arguments are, not against their distorted (straw men) version which are easy to refute as you tried to show us above.
e. You also say, “…Plantinga then makes the leap to conclude there is no good reason to believe the truthfulness of our belief (all that is derived from it, including naturalism and evolutionary theory). This is also false. Plantinga makes no such argument. His claim is based on the notion of that takes the conjunction of naturalism and evolution (N & E) and how, given naturalism and evolutionary processes our cognitive faculties could be unreliable and fail to “aim” at producing true beliefs. If that is so, even the very truth of the belief about naturalism and evolution would suffer from a defect in the aim of belief, which is truth, and hence the problem of self-defeating beliefs for a naturalist. This is even the most simplified version of Plantinga’s argument which has so many subtleties built into it.
f. I wish I had a clear idea as to what you wanted to say when you say the following: “By replacing the experimenter (her success in carrying out he experiment to be exact) with the experiment itself, Plantinga commits the straw man fallacy.” I’ve no ideas what you’re talking about here and hence I’d not attempt to respond to this idea. I must resist a temptation to respond in order not to end up committing a mistake in attributing an idea which might not be yours at the end of the day. It’d be great if you clarify the above quoted idea in your response.
2) You also say, “Not only has Plantinga placed the burden-of-(naturalistic)-proof for any natural phenomenon on the naturalists, but he equated naturalists’ ability (or lack thereof) to produce a proof as evidence against naturalism.” I’m not sure where you got such an idea from Plantinga’s works. It’d be great if you document a source for others also to read your sources so that your audience would be best served if you provide a link or a quotation, here and there. Having said this, I’d like to add this: Plantinga’s main arguments are not so much about naturalists, as fellow human beings, as it’s against the view called naturalism. You’re creating a straw man in order to easily refute again by attributing a view that is foreign to Plantinga. Plantinga addresses naturalists in the following sense in the present context: if they BELIEVE that the conjunction of naturalism and evolutionary theory is a rational belief, he argues that such a belief is not rational. Therefore, a naturalist who happens to believe such a conjunction is irrational and that is what Plantinga is committed to, at most. That has nothing to do with what you made out Plantinga is saying in your quote above. That is a straw man again.
3) I think the most important mistake in your piece is the claim to the effect “…that EAAN points to the increasing irrelevance of academic philosophy to mainstream belief (or lack thereof) in a God.” This is an example of defeat from the very beginning of making one’s case for naturalism. I wish you never made such a statement for that only shows a desire to avoid arguments and claim victory by simply saying this is irrelevant or that is irrelevant. I want to challenge you just to show us what you mean by (a) academic philosophy and (b) what constitutes in its irrelevance to the mainstream belief in God or the lack thereof. I know such a task would require you to write a book length development of your idea, which is indefensible as it’s now and perhaps at any time, but then you just said something that is almost unintelligible for some people such as academic philosophers who are also believers in much similar, albeit with nuanced understanding, of the same God, if you’re referring to a Judeo-Christian God. I must resist the philosopher’s temptation to show that such statements are really hard to make sense of but I decided to resist the temptation until you clarify your views!
4) And also, perhaps you’d do us a tremendous service if you clarify what you mean by “mainstream belief in God.” That idea might seem simple, obvious and clear for all yet the problem is that that is not the case. Some of your arguments easily fall prey to this rather vague, perhaps deliberately vague phrase that you keep using, explicitly or implicitly, which is giving rise to confusions, at least for me, for I think I’m tempted to show different yet competing understandings of such a phrase without knowing which one you’ve in mind. My friend, you’re dealing with a philosopher and I hope that you’d bear with me when I ask you for clarifications of this or that in order to better understand you.
5) For those who would like to read Plantinga’s EAAN here is a link; for an earlier version of his argument and for those who’d like to read a volume that was devoted to a full book length debate of the EAAN here is the title of the book: Beilby, James (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, Cornell University Press, 2002, 283pp.
6) My hope is that you’ve by now realized the difference between the contents and style and tons of what you originally shared on your blog (esp., with these topics: “Supernatural Dimension” and “The Bigger Arrogant” and how much work it takes to seriously make a case for the views that you wanted to communicate. Without even going all the way technical the issues you’ve shared in their original style and content and tones were a far cry from what you’re sharing with us now, much more nuanced and careful. This is to say thanks a lot for taking your time and sharing your more careful thoughts.
Once again, thanks a lot for your post that has provided a stimulating opportunity to interact, at least, for me.
Cheers,
Alethia
Thanks for your response to what I’ve tried to share with you on your blog. I’ll try to address your points in order:
1) I was warning you and hoping that you’d not commit some of the standard fallacious reasoning to defend some vague views by some of the notorious “science populaziers” that I’ve mentioned in my earlier posts. Alas, my friend that you seem to be giving in to such cheap ways “refuting” some subtle, philosophically nuanced, views that you do not seem to have even understood what they truly are. Perhaps I’m totally wrong about what I’ve just said but then the following points are intended to support the preceding points at any rate:
a. First, you’ve not shown any (serious) problem, let alone detecting a straw man fallacy, in Plantinga’s work, in his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN).
b. You say, “What is often the case with anti-naturalists like Plantinga is that they point to the lack of naturalistic explanation to a natural phenomenon and conclude naturalism is inconsistent (and shouldn’t be taken seriously). Herein lays the first problem with EAAN”. What you’ve shared here is false. You’re attributing to Plantinga what you think is his take on the naturalism vs. theism debate. One central point of Plantinga’s claims is that given naturalism and evolutionary theory (he states what such a theory amounts to any ways) it’s the CONJUNCTION of naturalism and evolutionary theory that creates problems for naturalism, mind you. How do you reconcile what I’ve quoted from you above with what I’ve just shared, if the latter is correct and we can double-check such views at any rate? You just missed a subtle point and wrongly attributed to Plantinga something that is foreign to his view. This, indeed, is called a straw man fallacy, since you’re arguing against a weak, easily assailable view which is not the view of the person to whom you attribute and claim the other person is wrong whereas the truth is otherwise.
c. As a matter of fact, Plantings thinks naturalism is false but he does not conclude that naturalism is inconsistent as it is. I quote Plantinga: “Naturalism alone may(or many not) be tenable, and the same goes to the view that we have evolved by way of the mechanisms to which contemporary evolutionary theory directs our attention; the conjunction of these two propositions, however, can’t rationally be accepted”. Link is provided below for the source of this quote.
d. If and when one is more careful about what one writes, one usually faces the inevitable: with the other daunting option of dealing with the serious argument one’s opponent holds and I want to see your argument exactly against what Plantinga’s arguments are, not against their distorted (straw men) version which are easy to refute as you tried to show us above.
e. You also say, “…Plantinga then makes the leap to conclude there is no good reason to believe the truthfulness of our belief (all that is derived from it, including naturalism and evolutionary theory). This is also false. Plantinga makes no such argument. His claim is based on the notion of that takes the conjunction of naturalism and evolution (N & E) and how, given naturalism and evolutionary processes our cognitive faculties could be unreliable and fail to “aim” at producing true beliefs. If that is so, even the very truth of the belief about naturalism and evolution would suffer from a defect in the aim of belief, which is truth, and hence the problem of self-defeating beliefs for a naturalist. This is even the most simplified version of Plantinga’s argument which has so many subtleties built into it.
f. I wish I had a clear idea as to what you wanted to say when you say the following: “By replacing the experimenter (her success in carrying out he experiment to be exact) with the experiment itself, Plantinga commits the straw man fallacy.” I’ve no ideas what you’re talking about here and hence I’d not attempt to respond to this idea. I must resist a temptation to respond in order not to end up committing a mistake in attributing an idea which might not be yours at the end of the day. It’d be great if you clarify the above quoted idea in your response.
2) You also say, “Not only has Plantinga placed the burden-of-(naturalistic)-proof for any natural phenomenon on the naturalists, but he equated naturalists’ ability (or lack thereof) to produce a proof as evidence against naturalism.” I’m not sure where you got such an idea from Plantinga’s works. It’d be great if you document a source for others also to read your sources so that your audience would be best served if you provide a link or a quotation, here and there. Having said this, I’d like to add this: Plantinga’s main arguments are not so much about naturalists, as fellow human beings, as it’s against the view called naturalism. You’re creating a straw man in order to easily refute again by attributing a view that is foreign to Plantinga. Plantinga addresses naturalists in the following sense in the present context: if they BELIEVE that the conjunction of naturalism and evolutionary theory is a rational belief, he argues that such a belief is not rational. Therefore, a naturalist who happens to believe such a conjunction is irrational and that is what Plantinga is committed to, at most. That has nothing to do with what you made out Plantinga is saying in your quote above. That is a straw man again.
3) I think the most important mistake in your piece is the claim to the effect “…that EAAN points to the increasing irrelevance of academic philosophy to mainstream belief (or lack thereof) in a God.” This is an example of defeat from the very beginning of making one’s case for naturalism. I wish you never made such a statement for that only shows a desire to avoid arguments and claim victory by simply saying this is irrelevant or that is irrelevant. I want to challenge you just to show us what you mean by (a) academic philosophy and (b) what constitutes in its irrelevance to the mainstream belief in God or the lack thereof. I know such a task would require you to write a book length development of your idea, which is indefensible as it’s now and perhaps at any time, but then you just said something that is almost unintelligible for some people such as academic philosophers who are also believers in much similar, albeit with nuanced understanding, of the same God, if you’re referring to a Judeo-Christian God. I must resist the philosopher’s temptation to show that such statements are really hard to make sense of but I decided to resist the temptation until you clarify your views!
4) And also, perhaps you’d do us a tremendous service if you clarify what you mean by “mainstream belief in God.” That idea might seem simple, obvious and clear for all yet the problem is that that is not the case. Some of your arguments easily fall prey to this rather vague, perhaps deliberately vague phrase that you keep using, explicitly or implicitly, which is giving rise to confusions, at least for me, for I think I’m tempted to show different yet competing understandings of such a phrase without knowing which one you’ve in mind. My friend, you’re dealing with a philosopher and I hope that you’d bear with me when I ask you for clarifications of this or that in order to better understand you.
5) For those who would like to read Plantinga’s EAAN here is a link; for an earlier version of his argument and for those who’d like to read a volume that was devoted to a full book length debate of the EAAN here is the title of the book: Beilby, James (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, Cornell University Press, 2002, 283pp.
6) My hope is that you’ve by now realized the difference between the contents and style and tons of what you originally shared on your blog (esp., with these topics: “Supernatural Dimension” and “The Bigger Arrogant” and how much work it takes to seriously make a case for the views that you wanted to communicate. Without even going all the way technical the issues you’ve shared in their original style and content and tones were a far cry from what you’re sharing with us now, much more nuanced and careful. This is to say thanks a lot for taking your time and sharing your more careful thoughts.
Once again, thanks a lot for your post that has provided a stimulating opportunity to interact, at least, for me.
Cheers,
Alethia
Re: The Many Problems of EAAN, Part I
I appreciate your detailed response to this blog. An appropriate response to each of your objections would have to wait until this weekend. Here is but a quick reply to one of your comments.
What Plantinga has failed to show is that in principle N&E implies there is no good reason to trust our beliefs. All he has done is asked his contemporaries to come up with a naturalistic explanation to how our "cognitive faculties could be reliable and 'aim' at producing true beliefs" given N&E, or risk abandoning naturalism all together. And this is an argument of the gaps.
To give you an example, consider the Intelligent Design (ID) argument. If ID proponents had just argued "nature is too complex thus must have a designer", they would have been immediately rejected and labeled god-of-the-gaps. Instead, they argued some biological entities are "irreducibly complex" thus must be designed. Of course if they could show this irreducibility, they would win their case (I've written on this topic and will post it here at a later time).
Similarly, Plantinga is basically arguing "no one has yet produced a good reason to believe why one should trust one's beliefs given N&E, thus [after some argument to the contrary based on current understanding and the evolutionary theory] one's beliefs are not trustworthy [statistically speaking]." And this is argument of the gap (unless, of course, one confuses the naturalistic principle with current naturalistic understanding of the natural world).
What Plantinga has failed to show is that in principle N&E implies there is no good reason to trust our beliefs. All he has done is asked his contemporaries to come up with a naturalistic explanation to how our "cognitive faculties could be reliable and 'aim' at producing true beliefs" given N&E, or risk abandoning naturalism all together. And this is an argument of the gaps.
To give you an example, consider the Intelligent Design (ID) argument. If ID proponents had just argued "nature is too complex thus must have a designer", they would have been immediately rejected and labeled god-of-the-gaps. Instead, they argued some biological entities are "irreducibly complex" thus must be designed. Of course if they could show this irreducibility, they would win their case (I've written on this topic and will post it here at a later time).
Similarly, Plantinga is basically arguing "no one has yet produced a good reason to believe why one should trust one's beliefs given N&E, thus [after some argument to the contrary based on current understanding and the evolutionary theory] one's beliefs are not trustworthy [statistically speaking]." And this is argument of the gap (unless, of course, one confuses the naturalistic principle with current naturalistic understanding of the natural world).
Re: The Many Problems of EAAN, Part I
Hi Ephraim:
I hope that you’ll also add the following thoughts to the ones that I’ve posted as I look forward to reading your responses whenever you get a chance to share them:
1) Among other things, I really look very much forward to reading your thoughts on point (3) in my previous post since that’s a very crucial point of departure for our exchange of thoughts. I’m not expecting an exact definition of what academic philosophy is (and how such a discipline is irrelevant to the issue in our discussion) but then I’d like to know some key ideas on which your arguments are predicated in relation to your take on academic philosophy. Since you meant to take the ‘failure” of EAAN as an example of academic philosophical exercise and how such exercises are irrelevant to “the mainstream belief in God” that seems to me a crucial idea worth explaining to strengthen your case.
2) And also, I just wanted to ask you a question about your post on the arrogance of religious people. As far as I can tell your accusations of religious people being arrogant seems to be based on some moral ground in the sense that religious people are blameworthy for not dismissing belief in God. I wonder on what basis you hold such people morally culpable for what they believe since your commitment to naturalism seems to deprive you of an objective, transcendent source of morality, which, if you’re aware of, is an Achilles’ heel for naturalism. Unless you’ve a new moral theory for your brand of naturalism/atheism, I’m extremely skeptical of the availability of objective moral anchor for naturalism that is superior to that of theism. If your moral theory, given naturalism/materialism, is incoherent or indefensible, I wonder how you’d maintain your accusation of theists being arrogant, which seems to be a moral failure on their part. I hope that you’re aware of the normative dimension of an ought statement with moral implications such as the one you used in your post I’m referring to and I really want to know how on earth normative, prescriptive statements could be accounted for given naturalism.
3) Hope that you’ll say something illuminating about the preceding concerns on my part that seem to be very crucial issues for our discussion in the days to come for I really want to know how you’ll make cases for the above points, among others. I’ll continue to outline too many problems for naturalism as the days go by so that all of us in your audience will see how you’ll address them in light of your extremely provocative and extremely superficial dismissal of theism as an alternative to naturalism, among others. I’ll eventually argue that theism is by far so much superior as a world view to provide more than adequate explanation for so many puzzling phenomena that humanity faces all the time. I look forward to reading your considered responses to my concerns.
Cheers,
Alethia
I hope that you’ll also add the following thoughts to the ones that I’ve posted as I look forward to reading your responses whenever you get a chance to share them:
1) Among other things, I really look very much forward to reading your thoughts on point (3) in my previous post since that’s a very crucial point of departure for our exchange of thoughts. I’m not expecting an exact definition of what academic philosophy is (and how such a discipline is irrelevant to the issue in our discussion) but then I’d like to know some key ideas on which your arguments are predicated in relation to your take on academic philosophy. Since you meant to take the ‘failure” of EAAN as an example of academic philosophical exercise and how such exercises are irrelevant to “the mainstream belief in God” that seems to me a crucial idea worth explaining to strengthen your case.
2) And also, I just wanted to ask you a question about your post on the arrogance of religious people. As far as I can tell your accusations of religious people being arrogant seems to be based on some moral ground in the sense that religious people are blameworthy for not dismissing belief in God. I wonder on what basis you hold such people morally culpable for what they believe since your commitment to naturalism seems to deprive you of an objective, transcendent source of morality, which, if you’re aware of, is an Achilles’ heel for naturalism. Unless you’ve a new moral theory for your brand of naturalism/atheism, I’m extremely skeptical of the availability of objective moral anchor for naturalism that is superior to that of theism. If your moral theory, given naturalism/materialism, is incoherent or indefensible, I wonder how you’d maintain your accusation of theists being arrogant, which seems to be a moral failure on their part. I hope that you’re aware of the normative dimension of an ought statement with moral implications such as the one you used in your post I’m referring to and I really want to know how on earth normative, prescriptive statements could be accounted for given naturalism.
3) Hope that you’ll say something illuminating about the preceding concerns on my part that seem to be very crucial issues for our discussion in the days to come for I really want to know how you’ll make cases for the above points, among others. I’ll continue to outline too many problems for naturalism as the days go by so that all of us in your audience will see how you’ll address them in light of your extremely provocative and extremely superficial dismissal of theism as an alternative to naturalism, among others. I’ll eventually argue that theism is by far so much superior as a world view to provide more than adequate explanation for so many puzzling phenomena that humanity faces all the time. I look forward to reading your considered responses to my concerns.
Cheers,
Alethia
Re: The Many Problems of EAAN, Part I
I've posted your comment on The Bigger Arrogant under that blog. Please follow the link for responses to your comment (part 2). I will respond to your comments on this blog as soon as possible (FYI, I hope to post parts II and III of this blog soon).
Re: The Many Problems of EAAN, Part I
It seems to me that you fail to understand how the EAAN works. It does not, as you seem to think, argue that evolution and naturalism fail to explain how we can have veridical beliefs.
Rather, it argues that given what we know of evolution, it is far more likely that a mostly false set of life-sustaining beliefs would be created than a mostly true set of beliefs. This is because there are simply far more false beliefs that in any given situation would be useful for survival than the one true belief.
It isn't simply an argument 'of the gaps' as it does not point out a lack of evidence--rather it attempts to produce a probabilistic reductio ad absurdam.
Anyway, I think the argument fails also and for various reasons--just not the ones you've tried to point out.
Rather, it argues that given what we know of evolution, it is far more likely that a mostly false set of life-sustaining beliefs would be created than a mostly true set of beliefs. This is because there are simply far more false beliefs that in any given situation would be useful for survival than the one true belief.
It isn't simply an argument 'of the gaps' as it does not point out a lack of evidence--rather it attempts to produce a probabilistic reductio ad absurdam.
Anyway, I think the argument fails also and for various reasons--just not the ones you've tried to point out.